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Abstract
The scal decit of the Spanish Autonomous Communities (ACs) is investigated using non-
stationary panel data analysis. The paper considers the two main approaches in the literature, rst
assessing whether there is a long-run relationship between the revenues and expenditures of the
ACs and second focusing on the use of scal rules. The paper shows that it is possible to relate
these approaches in a unied framework.
JEL Classication: E62, H62, C12, C22
Keywords: Fiscal decit, 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1 Introduction
The sustainability of government scal policy is a major issue, especially in the current context
in which developed economies are facing the e¤ects of the global crisis. E¤orts to contain public
spending and streamlining the provision of public goods is an objective of present governments
trying to reactivate economies in an environment in which there is di¢ culty in nding funding and
liquidity. Borrowers monitor governmentsaccounts when deciding where to locate their investment
and loans. In this scenario, Spain is a case of relevant interest, given the adjustment procedures
that have been implemented to reduce the level of debt and the pressure of the scal decit on the
Spanish economy. It is also of interest in that since the beginning of the democratic period in 1978,
Spain has started a process of transferring competences to the Spanish regions, or autonomous
communities (ACs), which involves the transferral of certain taxes and the provision of public
services essentially, security, health and education. This decentralized scal position has led the
central government to monitor the ACs when trying to reduce the excessive decit and debt levels
of the Spanish economy.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the sustainability of the scal policy of the ACs as a
whole using the two approaches that have mainly been adopted in the literature. The concept of
sustainability of scal policy implies the fullment of the so-called intertemporal budget constraint,
which states that the current level of debt in an economy should equal the present value of future
scal surpluses. If this condition is to be met, economies cannot indenitely issue debt to cover scal
decits as the markets will observe a risk of bankruptcy. To test whether this condition is satised,
two di¤erent relationships are analysed. First, the study uses panel data cointegration techniques
to assess whether there is a long-run relationship between the revenues and expenditures. Second,
it investigates if the scal rule that relates the scal primary surplus and debt levels holds for the
Spanish ACs.
The information available for conducting the study covers the period 19842012, thus dening
series on the scal variables of revenues, expenditures and debt over a relatively short time period.1
This suggests that the analysis of scal decit sustainability should be based on the use of panel
data techniques to combine information for both temporal and cross-sectional dimensions. The
analysis should also take into account that the scal variables used here show a high degree of
persistence, i.e. they can be I(1) non-stationary variables. In line with this, econometric techniques
that consider this feature should be applied if meaningful conclusions are to be obtained. The paper
discusses the di¤erent alternatives that exist in the literature when specifying models that will allow
the assessment of the sustainability of scal decit and the (necessary and su¢ cient) conditions
that must be fullled. As discussed in the following sections, there are methodological positions
that may seem contradictory, although this paper shows the connecting links among them.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of selected literature on scal
sustainability. Section 3 develops the arithmetic of debt and its relation to the scal decit, ex-
plaining the conditions of scal decit sustainability. Section 4 presents scal rules as an alternative
way of assessing scal decit sustainability. Section 5 describes the database. Section 6 details the
econometric methodology and the results of its application. Finally, Section 7 concludes. All tables
and gures appear in the on-line companion appendix.
1 It should be borne in mind that the territorial organization of the Spanish ACs was implemented in 1984, so
there is no previous information concerning this level of government.
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2 Review of the literature
The contributions in the literature can broadly be classied into two groups. First, there are the
analyses based on a univariate approach, which study the order of integration of the decit (in-
cluding interest payments on debt) (see HAMILTON and FLAVIN, 1986) or the stock of public
debt (see WILCOX, 1989). Second, there are studies that are based on a multivariate approach,
examining if there is a long-run relationship between the ows of revenues and expenditures (see,
for example, TREHAN and WALSH, 1988; HAKKIO and RUSH, 1991; HAUG, 1991; QUINTOS,
1995; MARTIN, 2000). Aiming to reconcile both approaches, TREHAN and WALSH (1991) derive
su¢ cient conditions for scal sustainability, which require (i) that there is a cointegrating relation-
ship between the primary decit and debt and (ii) that the quasi-di¤erence of the primary decit
is an I(0) stationary process.
These early studies focused mainly on US scal sustainability. Other subsequent studies have re-
ned the analysis by incorporating the possibility of di¤erent economic systems (structural changes)
that are associated with di¤erent degrees of sustainability (see, for example, QUINTOS, 1995;
MARTIN, 2000; AFONSO, 2005) and have also generalized the denition of sustainability to distin-
guish between strict and weak sustainability (see the discussion below). AFONSO (2005) provides
a comprehensive summary of empirical studies in the literature.
BOHN (1998) criticizes these analyses, arguing that, in principle, any order of integration of
the public debt is consistent with the fullment of the intertemporal budget constraint. BOHN
(1998, 2007) o¤ers an alternative way of assessing the sustainability of the public decit, a proposal
that is based on the specication of a scal rule measuring the reaction of the primary surplus to
variations in the level of debt. Thus, a (statistically signicant) positive response of the primary
surplus to changes in debt would constitute a su¢ cient condition for the sustainability of scal
policy. According to BOHN (2007), the relationship between the primary decit and debt is of
economic interest and goes beyond establishing whether or not there is a cointegrating relationship
between the scal variables. However, QUINTOS (1995) shows that the assessment of the order of
integration of the public debt is still relevant, provided that it gives information on the degree of
sustainability (strong or weak) of scal decit.
The encouraging point of BOHNs (2007) criticism lies in trying to nd signicant relationships
between the primary decit and debt. However, it should be borne in mind that the estimation
and statistical inference analyses that he proposes require assessing the order of integration of the
variables involved in the relationship if misleading conclusions are to be avoided. It is well known
that the consistence of the estimated parameters of the models that relate I(1) non-stationary
variables depends on whether cointegration exists. Consequently, as a preliminary step in estimating
the models advocated by BOHN (1998, 2007), it is necessary to assess the order of integration of
the scal variables, given the risk of facing a spurious relationship if the variables in the model are
I(1) non-stationary stochastic processes.
The two methodological approaches discussed so far have also been applied in a regional envi-
ronment. On the one hand, WESTERLUND et al. (2011) analyse the relationship between the
revenues and expenditures at the state and local government levels for the US using panel data
cointegration techniques. On the other hand, ESTELLER and SOLÉ (2004) applied the BOHNs
(1998) methodology to analyse the sustainability of the scal policy of Spanish ACs, but without
considering the non-stationarity of the variables. As can be seen, the empirical evidence on scal
sustainability at the regional level is scarce and mostly concentrated in the US economy. The
analysis that is conducted in this paper is interesting as it increases empirical evidence focusing
on the Spanish ACs, where the decentralization system and scal sustainability are hot political
topics at present. The approach that is adopted in this paper uses procedures designed to work
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with non-stationary panel data, a strategy that has not yet been implemented in the case of the
Spanish regions.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the estimated specications in the papers mentioned above
are heterogeneous in terms of the denition of the variables involved in the analysis. There are
studies that use scal variables in nominal terms, or in real terms relative to GDP or to the
population. BOHN (2005, 2007) indicates that this is not important as long as the discount factor
is measured adequately. In our case, the variables are used in levels and expressed in real terms.
3 The arithmetic of debt and scal sustainability
The government budget constraint for each period can be written as:
Bt = Gt  Rt = DEFt; (1)
where Bt is the market value of government debt in real terms, Gt is the government spending
in real terms, including interest payments, Rt represents the revenues in real terms, and  is
the di¤erence operator. The decit (DEFt) is the di¤erence between government revenues and
expenditures of a time period, a variable that by denition equals the change in the debt. If it
denotes the real interest rate2 and assuming that this variable is I(0) stationary around a mean
value i (see HAKKIO and RUSH, 1991), it is possible to dene:
Gt = GEt + itBt 1; (2)
where GEt is the actual expenditure, excluding interest payments, and the second term of the right
side of equation (2) represents the payment of interest on the accumulated debt at the end of the
previous period. Note that the debt can be expressed as:
Bt = (1 + i)Bt 1 + EXPt  Rt;
where EXPt = GEt+(it   i)Bt 1 or alternatively, Bt = (1= (1 + i)) (Rt+1   EXPt+1)+(1= (1 + i))
Bt+1. As the government is subject to the same budget constraint in t + 1, t + 2, and so on, the
budgetary constraints of each period can be intertemporally added and obtain:
Bt =
1X
j=0

1
(1 + i)
j+1
(Rt+j+1   EXPt+j+1) + lim
j!1

1
(1 + i)
j+1
Bt+j+1: (3)
The intertemporal budget balance occurs if and only if the present value of government debt
equals the present value of future budget surpluses,
Bt =
1X
j=0

1
(1 + i)
j+1
(Rt+j+1   EXPt+j+1) ; (4)
i.e. if and only if the transversality condition holds:
Et
 
lim
j!1

1
(1 + i)
j+1
Bt+j+1
!
= 0; (5)
2Note that the variables could be expressed in nominal terms or as a ratio of real GDP. If the variables are in
nominal terms, it is the nominal interest rate. If the variables are expressed in real terms, it is the real interest rate.
Finally, if the variables are expressed as a ratio of GDP, 1+ it would be the interest rate adjusted by the growth rate
of the economy, which is obtained by dividing the nominal growth rate of the GDP.
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where Et () denotes the conditional expectation on the information set available at time t. If the
condition given by equation (5) is satised, then the decit is sustainable, given that the stock of
debt that remains in the hands of the economic agents will grow at a slower rate on average than
the growth rate of the economy (approximated by the real interest rate). Therefore, this implies
that the government is not nancing its decit by issuing new debt following a Ponzi scheme game.
To implement the empirical testing of scal sustainability, the rst di¤erence in equation (3) is
taken to obtain:
Bt = Gt  Rt =
1X
j=0

1
(1 + i)
j+1
(Rt+j+1  EXPt+j+1) + lim
j!1

1
(1 + i)
j+1
Bt+j+1; (6)
so that sustainability is associated with the transversality condition:
Et
 
lim
j!1

1
(1 + i)
j+1
Bt+j+1
!
= 0: (7)
If the condition given by equation (7) is satised, it can be concluded that there is an intertemporal
budget balance (decit sustainability) because this would imply that the government would incur
a future surplus that is equal in expected value to the market value of the debt.
The empirical literature has followed two di¤erent approaches when assessing the sustainability
of scal decit. One group of studies  the univariate-based approach  has concentrated on
analysing the stochastic properties of Bt (see HAMILTON and FLAVIN,1986; WILCOX, 1989). In
this case, scal decit sustainability would require Bt to be I(0) stationary, i.e. a condition that is
equivalent to checking whether the I(1) non-stationary vector of variables (Gt; Rt) are cointegrated
with the cointegration vector (1; 1)0. A second group of studies the multivariate-based approach
analyses whether the vector of variables (Gt; Rt) generate a cointegrating relationship, assuming
that the cointegration vector is known and equal to (1; 1)0; in this case, this result in the approach
of the rst group of studies or estimating the cointegration vector (see TREHAN and WALSH,
1988, 1991; HAKKIO and RUSH, 1991; HAUG, 1991; QUINTOS, 1995; MARTIN 2000).
TREHAN and WALSH (1991) can be considered as the rst contribution to unify both ap-
proaches. In particular, TREHAN and WALSH (1991) are the rst explicitly to derive the con-
ditions for scal decit sustainability in terms of a relationship between the primary decit (the
decit excluding interest payments on debt) and debt. In addition, HAKKIO and RUSH (1991)
implicitly point to a relationship between the decit and debt, although they concentrate on the
cointegrating relationship between the components of the primary decit. HAKKIO and RUSH
(1991) postulate that if the total revenues and total expenditures are I(1) non-stationary variables
that dene the cointegrating relationship thus:
Rt = + Gt + ut; (8)
with 0 <   1, then the condition that prevents a Ponzi game situation is satised. In this model,
the value of  in equation (8) determines the degree of sustainability. Thus, 0 <  < 1 is associated
with weak sustainability, whereas  = 1 denes the sustainability in the strict sense (or strong
sustainability). In economic terms, sustainability in the weak sense corresponds to a situation
in which the government reacts to an increase in public debt, but this correction is not equal to
the growth of public expenditure. In this case, an unsteady growing decit and an increase in
public debt can be observed. Consequently, HAKKIO and RUSH (1991) argue that a cointegrating
relationship between Rt and Gt would be necessary for a strict interpretation of the sustainability
of the decit. However, QUINTOS (1995) indicates that 0 <   1 in equation (8) would be a
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necessary and su¢ cient condition for scal decit sustainability, and the cointegrating relationship
between Rt and Gt regardless of whether or not the cointegration vector is imposed would only
be a su¢ cient condition for scal decit sustainability. In this regard, the debt could be either I(1)
or I(2) and the scal decit sustainability would still hold, although the interpretation would be
qualitatively di¤erent: in the event that the debt is I(1), there is strict sustainability, whereas if
the debt is I(2), the sustainability will be weak.
QUINTOS (1995) remarks that although 0 <  < 1 constitutes a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for the sustainability of the public decit, this is not consistent with the possibility that
the government might market its debt in the long term. The fact that 0 <  < 1 has important
implications in terms of economic policy. If a government spends more than it raises, it will have
a high risk of failure and will have to o¤er a higher interest rate to put its debt on the market.
Another interesting aspect highlighted in QUINTOS (1995) is the di¤erent rate at which the scal
decit tends towards sustainability, which is determined by the order of integration of Bt (see
Theorem 1.1 in QUINTOS, 1995). Thus, the rate at which equation (7) tends to zero is higher if
Bt  I (1) than in the case that Bt  I (2).
The main weakness of the proposal in QUINTOS (1995) is the way in which the test strategy
is carried out. First, a consistent estimation of the parameter  in equation (8) is required; second,
it is necessary to test whether 0 <   1. In the case that the revenues and expenditures of the
government are I(1) variables, estimating equation (8) can lead either to a spurious relationship
(in which the estimated parameters are inconsistent), or to a cointegrating relationship (in which
the estimated parameters are (super) consistent). On the one hand, in a spurious relationship,
the value of  cannot be identied by using estimation techniques based on individual analysis
(country-by-country or region-by-region analysis) this is the case in the empirical application in
QUINTOS (1995), in which the sustainability of the US scal decit is analysed. On the other
hand, in the case that the model denes a cointegrating relationship, it is possible to obtain a
consistent estimate of , the statistical inference requiring the application of an e¢ cient estimation
method. Therefore, the main problem lies in the identication of the  parameter in the possible
case of no cointegration. As discussed below, this problem can be solved if the analysis is carried
out using non-stationary panel data techniques.
4 Sustainability of scal decit and scal rules
The strategy to test for scal decit sustainability presented in the previous section has received
some criticism in the literature, giving rise to alternative approaches. In this regard, BOHN (1998)
proposes estimating a scal rule to assess the sustainability of the scal policy of the government.
Basically, BOHN (1998) suggests checking whether there is a corrective response by the government
to increases in the public debt. The focus is on the response from the primary surplus non-nancial
revenues less non-nancial expenditures (excluding interest payments on debt) to changes in the
level of the public debt. The model suggested in BOHN (1998) for the US economy takes the form:
St = B

t + Zt + "t; (9)
where the primary surplus is given by St = Rt  Gt , Gt being the government spending excluding
interest payments on debt, Bt the level of debt in the economy at the beginning of period t (which
can be approximated by the level of debt in the period t   1) and nally, Zt being a vector of
explanatory variables that capture the economic cycle.3 The su¢ cient condition for sustainability
3 In fact, BOHN (1998) denes the primary surplus and debt at the beginning of the period divided by the GDP
of the economy. This transformation has no inuence on the interpretation of his model, so to be consistent with the
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requires  > 0 in equation (9) so that the government would be taking corrective actions reducing
the level of expenditure (excluding interest on debt) and/or increasing tax revenues to o¤set the
changes in the level of debt. This approximation for assessing scal sustainability is known as the
backward-looking approach, in which a positive response from the primary surplus to the debt of
the economy is expected. It would be also possible to implement the forward-looking approach in
CANZONERI et al. (2001), which expects that a change in the primary surplus causes a positive
reaction of the future debt (for further details, see BAJO-RUBIO et al., 2009, 2014). This paper
is based on the backward-looking approach in BOHN (1998).
The sign of  in equation (9) provides an additional interpretation regarding the interaction be-
tween monetary and scal policies and its relation to the price level determination of the economies.
As pointed out in BAJO-RUBIO et al. (2014),  > 0 would indicate the prevalence of a mone-
tary dominant regime, in which the monetary authority is expected to set the price level without
constraint, whereas scal authority would adjust so that the budget surplus path would be endoge-
nous. On the contrary,   0 would indicate the prevalence of a scal dominance regime, which
assumes that scal authorities are able to set primary surpluses that follow an arbitrary process,
not necessarily compatible with solvency. In this case, the budget surplus would be exogenous and
the endogenous adjustment of the price level would be required to achieve scal solvency.
BOHN (1998) mentions that it is possible to proceed in two di¤erent ways. First, if the primary
surplus and debt are I(1) non-stationary variables, one might consider the relationship:
St = B

t + vt; (10)
and test for the presence of cointegration between St and Bt . If cointegration holds, that would
mean that vt = Zt + "t is an I(0) stationary process, so that, according to BOHN (1998), it
would not be necessary explicitly to model the e¤ect of the economic cycle on the primary surplus
to obtain a consistent estimate of . Second, if the primary surplus and debt are I(0) stationary
variables, then equation (9) should be estimated with the inclusion of the cyclical determinants of
the scal surplus to ensure a consistent estimate of .
Beyond the specic case that is analysed in BOHN (1998), it might be that there is a link
between the testing strategy that has been described in the previous section and Bohns proposal.
First, and in order to implement the approach in BOHN (1998), the order of integration of the
variables needs to be known, something that is in itself the rst way to check if the scal decit is
weakly or strongly sustainable. Therefore, a link between the two approaches can be established.
Notwithstanding this, the relationship between the two approaches goes further.
Suppose that the scal variables involved in the model are I(1) non-stationary variables, so that
equation (10) can be expressed as:
Rt  Gt = Bt + vt (11)
Rt = G

t + B

t + vt: (12)
The comparison of equations (12) and (8) reveals that, apart from a constant term which BOHN
(1998) also included when estimating the model there are, apparently, two di¤erences. First, in
equation (8) the total expenditure:
Gt = G

t + rtBt 1; (13)
is used, while in equation (12) a similar explanatory variable is used:
Gt = G

t + Bt 1; (14)
denition of the variables used so far, this paper uses variables in levels. As for the other explanatory variables (Zt),
BOHN (1998) uses the variables GVAR and YVAR given in BARRO (1986), which aim to capture the temporary
government spending and cyclical variations of the output of the economy, respectively.
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and, second, in equation (8) no restriction is imposed on , while equation (12) imposes  = 1.
As can be seen, the main di¤erence lies in the denition of the interest rate that is used; whereas
equation (13) takes into account the interest rate for each period, equation (14) considers an average
interest rate.
BOHNs (1998) model makes it possible to relate his su¢ cient conditions for scal decit sus-
tainability to those drawn from the approaches described in the previous section, which rely on
cointegration analysis. Thus, BOHN (2007) indicates that, in the case that equation (12) represents
a cointegrating relationship, three situations may occur:
  > r, r being the average interest rate of the debt, a situation that would imply I(0)
stationarity of the decit and debt;
 0 <  < r, a situation that would cause slightly explosive behaviour of the decit and debt,
but with su¢ ciently slow growth to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint;
  = r, which implies that the debt would be an I(1) non-stationary process and the decit an
I(0) stationary process, fullling the intertemporal budget constraint as in QUINTOS (1995).
To sum up, BOHNs (1998) model can be seen as a special case of the approach based on the
analysis of cointegration discussed in the previous section, where (i) the condition is imposed that
the cointegration vector is known and equal to (1; 1)0 and (ii) that the payment of debt interests
is calculated using a constant interest rate which can be dened as the average of the real interest
rate. Given these features and as set forth in QUINTOS (1995), a particular denition of the
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the sustainability of the public decit appears which requires
that rt = . Finally, it should be noted that the model given by equation (10) relates a ow variable
(primary surplus) and a stock variable (debt), both possibly being I(1) non-stationary variables.
If so, this specication is related to the concept of multicointegration proposed by GRANGER
and LEE (1989) and applied to the analysis of scal sustainability in BERENGUER-RICO and
CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2011), ESCARIO et al. (2012), and CAMARERO et al. (2015), among
others.
5 Data and descriptive analysis
The main source of information used in this paper is the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finance,
which provides consolidated revenues and expenditures, settled by chapters, for the 17 Spanish ACs
regions for the period 19842012. From the level breakdown at which the data are available, the
non-nancial revenues and expenditures of the ACs can be obtained, which allows computation of
the decit and primary surplus of the Spanish ACs.4 The debt of the Spanish ACs is taken from
various issues of the Monthly Bulletin of the Bank of Spain, whereas the GDP deator of each AC
is obtained from the BDMORES database and the Regional Accounting of the Spanish National
Statistical Institute (INE).
Figure A.1 presents the non-nancial revenues and expenditures in real terms of the ACs, while
Figure A.2 provides the debt and decit. Finally, Figure A.3 depicts the evolution of the public
debt, both in nominal and real terms. Figures A.1 to A.3 are provided in the online companion
appendix. As can be seen, the overall debt of the ACs experienced sustained growth over the
4One might consider removing the two Spanish AC foral regions that have a funding system di¤erent from the
other ACs, giving them greater autonomy in their decisions regarding raising and spending funds. However, these
ACs also face the same conditions as the other ACs when assessing whether or not their scal policy is sustainable
and it was thus decided to keep them in the sample.
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period analysed. There are, however, exceptions to this behaviour in some sub-periods. First, note
that some ACs experienced a reduction in debt in real terms Andalusia (20002008), the Basque
Country and Navarre (19962007); in contrast, others saw a real deadlock in debt  the case of
La Rioja in the period 19912008, Aragon, the Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia and Murcia in
the period 19962008, and Madrid in 20032008. For the rest of the ACs, the debt increase was
sustained throughout the period. Finally, it should be mentioned that this study covers the recent
economic crisis, which a¤ected the Spanish economy at the end of the period analysed. The short
time period covered by the time series used and the occurrence of the economic crisis at the end
of the period make it di¢ cult to investigate the presence of structural instabilities, something that
could be addressed in future research.
6 Panel data integration and cointegration analyses
Previous analyses in the literature have characterized the scal variables involved in the model
specication described above as I(1) non-stationary processes, although it is possible that relation-
ships among I(1) variables lead to consistent estimates of the parameters if the variables generate
a cointegrating relationship. In this paper, the order of integration and cointegration analyses are
performed using panel data techniques. The advantage of taking into account the statistical infor-
mation from both the temporal and cross-sectional dimensions is the improvement in the statistical
inference, given that panel data unit root and cointegration test statistics are supposed to be more
powerful than those based on individual information. However, non-stationary panel data tech-
niques can lead to misleading conclusions if the presence of cross-sectional dependence among the
units of the panel data sets is not taken into account. The rst generation of non-stationary panel
data techniques assumed independence among the units of the panel data sets, an assumption that,
if not satised, will introduce a bias to conclude in favour of the stationarity of the panel data (see
BANERJEE et al. 2004, 2005). Although it is now common practice to apply panel data unit root
and stationarity tests that account for cross-sectional dependence, few studies test whether such
dependence exists. The application of these cross-sectional dependence tests can also provide some
hints on the type of cross-sectional dependence that is present.
6.1 Panel data cross-sectional dependence
This section computes the test statistics in PESARAN (2004, 2014), henceforth, denoted as WCD
and WCDLM statistics, and the statistic in NG (2006), denoted as the svr statistic, testing the
null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence against the alternative hypothesis of cross-sectional
dependence using pair-wise Pearson correlation coe¢ cients. The application of the test statistic in
NG (2006) is also interesting because it provides information concerning the degree of dependence.
Thus, NG (2006) proposes dening a group of small (S) correlation coe¢ cients and a group of large
(L) correlation coe¢ cients, where # denotes the proportion of correlation coe¢ cients in the S group.
Once the sample of correlation coe¢ cients has been split, the null hypothesis of no correlation in
both sub-samples can be tested. If # is large, it indicates that the dependence is pervasive.
Table A.1 presents the results of calculating the WCD, WCDLM and svr statistics for each
panel data set. The qualitative conclusion that can be drawn is that the WCD test clearly rejects
the null hypothesis of no correlation this conclusion is supported by the WCDLM test statistic.
The large values of these statistics can be taken as an indication that strong cross-sectional de-
pendence is a¤ecting the units of the panel data. This can be conrmed by computing the degree
of cross-sectional dependence as in BAILEY et al. (2012). As can be seen, the point estimate 
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is close to one for the two variables for which it can be computed, although the 90% condence
interval dened by (L;U ) gives a wide range of values for this parameter.
The svr statistic in NG (2006) shows that the null hypothesis of no correlation cannot be rejected
at the 5% signicance level for the small sub-sample of correlations for all variables (see the p-values
associated with the svr(S) statistic), while it is clearly rejected when analysing the sub-sample of
large correlations (see the results for the svr(L) statistic). It should also be noted that the L
group is considerably more numerous than the S group, which indicates that (i) there is evidence
of strong cross-sectional correlation and (ii) that the correlation is pervasive (see NG, 2006). When
all correlations are considered, the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence is clearly rejected
for all variables. It should be mentioned that the pervasiveness of the cross-sectional dependence
suggests that panel data unit root and cointegration test statistics can capture the cross-sectional
dependence by dening common factor models, as suggested by BAI and NG (2004).
6.2 Panel data order of integration analysis
Given the conclusions obtained above, panel data unit root test statistics that incorporate unob-
servable common factors to capture the cross-sectional dependence are computed. BAI and NG
(2004), MOON and PERRON (2004) and PESARAN (2007) provide three of the proposals avail-
able in the literature that include the use of common factors when testing the order of integration.5
Table A.2 provides the results of the two test statistics proposed in PESARAN (2007) denoted as
CIPS and CIPS* for di¤erent values of the order of the autoregressive correction (p) used when
estimating the ADF auxiliary regression equations. In general, the results lead to the non-rejection
of the null hypothesis of panel data unit root at the 5% signicance level, regardless of the order of
the autoregressive correction; there is only one exception as the null hypothesis of unit root is not
rejected for the primary surplus with p = 0. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is strong
evidence that the variables considered are I(1) non-stationarity processes. Table A.2 also includes
the results of the test statistics proposed by MOON and PERRON (2004), denoted by ta and tb.
The evidence drawn from these statistics depends on the variable and the number of common fac-
tors (r). On the one hand, in general the null hypothesis of panel data unit root cannot be rejected
at a signicance level of 5% for the revenues, except when r = 1 and the tb statistic is used, or for
the debt and the decit. On the other hand, the null hypothesis of unit root is clearly rejected for
the primary surplus, regardless of the number of common factors and test statistic that is used.
Finally, the results for the expenditures are mixed as the null hypothesis of unit root cannot be
rejected when r  4, but it is rejected for r = 5 and r = 6.6 Consequently, the evidence obtained
from these two test statistics is not as clear-cut as that obtained with Pesarans statistics, although
in most cases it is possible to conclude that the variables are I(1).
The evidence obtained with the Pesaran and MoonPerron test statistics may be biased because
of the assumption that the dynamic of the common factors is the same as that driving the idiosyn-
cratic disturbance term. This limitation is overcome by the proposal in BAI and NG (2004), which
analyses the order of integration of the common factors and the idiosyncratic disturbance terms
5As noted by BAI and NG (2009), the proposals in MOON and PERRON (2004) and PESARAN (2007) control the
presence of cross-sectional dependence allowing for common factors, although the common factors and idiosyncratic
shocks are restricted to have the same order of integration. Therefore, it is not possible to cover situations in which
one component (e.g. the common factors) is I(0) and the other component (for example, the idiosyncratic shocks)
is I(1), and vice versa. In practical terms, it transpires that the test statistics in MOON and PERRON (2004) and
PESARAN (2007) are statistical procedures that provide statistical inference only on the idiosyncratic shocks, where
the dynamics of both the idiosyncratic and the common components are restricted to be the same.
6The use of the di¤erent information criteria in BAI and NG (2002) always leads to selecting the maximum number
of common factors that is specied.
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separately. Table A.2 reports on the test statistics proposed in BAI and NG (2004). The conclusion
obtained from these statistics is that all variables present symptoms of being I(1) non-stationary
stochastic processes as in all cases the presence of I(1) non-stationary common factors is detected,
i.e. r^1 > 0.7 Therefore, and regardless of the stochastic properties of the idiosyncratic disturbance
terms, all variables are I(1) non-stationary panel data sets.
6.3 Panel data cointegration
This section computes the panel cointegration test statistics taken from BANERJEE and CARRION-
I-SILVESTRE (2011, 2014), WESTERLUND (2008) and BAI and CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2013)
as these account for the presence of cross-sectional dependence among the units of the panel data
through the specication of an approximate common factor model.8 This paper applies the two al-
ternative approaches to analyse the sustainability of scal policy discussed above. The rst strategy
requires testing the presence of cointegration in the model given by equation (8):
Rt = + Gt + ut: (15)
The second alternative is dened in BOHN (1998) and is based on the estimation of the scal rule
given by equation (10):
St = + B

t + vt: (16)
To estimate equation (16), BOHN (1998) considers that the level of debt at the beginning of period
t is proxied by the level of debt in period t  1.
6.3.1 Relationship between revenues and expenditures
Table A.3 shows that the procedure designed by BANERJEE and CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2015)
detects the presence of an I(1) non-stationary common factor (r^1 = 1) that drives the cross-sectional
dependence of the panel data model.9 As for the panel cointegration, the ADF test applied to the
idiosyncratic disturbance terms leads to rejection of the null hypothesis of no panel cointegration
at the 5% signicance level. Consequently, there is evidence for a long-term relationship (cointegra-
tion) between the revenues and expenditures once the cross-sectional dependence has been taken
into account. This conclusion is also achieved with the application of the CADFp test statistic, de-
livering a parameter estimate of ^ = 0:8727 in equation (8) it is worth mentioning that regardless
of the presence of panel cointegration, this estimation is a consistent estimate of the relationship
between revenues and expenditures.
Turning to the DH test statistics from WESTERLUND (2008), the conclusions depend on the
degree of homogeneity that is assumed. While the test statistic that allows for heterogeneity in the
7As above, the use of di¤erent information criteria to estimate the number of common factors always leads to
choosing the maximum number of common factors specied.
8 It is worth mentioning that there are some important features that are common to and distinguish these proposals.
First, one important di¤erence concerns the order of integration of the common factors as WESTERLUND (2008)
considers that all common factors are I(0) stationary, whereas the other approaches assume that there might be a
combination of I(0) and I(1), as in BAI and NG (2004). Second, BAI and CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2013) consider
the most general case, in which the common factors might both a¤ect the dependent variable and the stochastic
regressors, whereas the other proposals assume that the common factors and the stochastic regressors are orthogonal.
Finally, in BANERJEE and CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2011), the e¤ect of the unobserved common factors is taken
into account, as in PESARAN (2006) who uses cross-sectional averages to proxy the common factors. The other
proposals estimate the common factors using principal components, as in BAI and NG (2004).
9The total number of common factors is denoted by r. The number of I(1) non-stationary common factors is
denoted by r1, whereas the number of I(0) stationary common factors is r0, so that r = r0 + r1.
12
autoregressive coe¢ cient (DHg) leads to rejection of the null hypothesis of no panel cointegration,
the statistic that imposes homogeneity (DHp) does not reject the null hypothesis when 3 to 5
common factors are specied. The contradiction between these two test statistics and the results
obtained with the other two procedures may indicate that the assumption of homogeneity when
testing for the presence of cointegration is not advisable.
The application of the test statistic from BAI and CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2013) reinforces
the presence of a cointegrating relationship between revenues and expenditures, regardless of the
number of common factors (see Table A.4). As can be seen, the estimated  parameter in equation
(8) is around one, with values ranging from 0.943 to 1.005 depending on the number of common
factors.
6.3.2 Relationship between primary surplus and debt
In this case, the panel data cointegration test statistics derived from BANERJEE and CARRION-I-
SILVESTRE (2011, 2015) and WESTERLUND (2008) indicate that there is cointegration between
the primary surplus and the debt. This conclusion is reinforced when computing the test statistics
given in BAI and CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2013) as in general the null hypothesis of no panel data
cointegration is clearly rejected by the Pm and P statistics the exception being when 4 common
factors are specied and for theMSB statistic if 1, 5 or 6 common factors are considered. These
results indicate that there is a long-run relationship between the primary surplus and the debt.
It should be noted that regardless of the presence of cointegration, using the common correlated
e¤ects (CCE) estimator from BANERJEE and CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2011) provides a consis-
tent estimate of the  parameter which measures the relationship between the primary surplus and
the debt. Table A.3 shows that ^ = 0:1742 (sustainability is met, in terms of Bohns requirements),
whereas the estimates in Table A.4 depend on the number of common factors allowed, ranging
between -0.073 (no sustainability, in terms of Bohns denition) and 0.143 (sustainability is met).
6.4 Estimation of the panel cointegration relationships: Fiscal decit sustain-
ability analysis
This section presents the estimated cointegrating relationships of the two approaches used to deter-
mine the sustainability of the scal policy of the Spanish ACs. Due to the presence of cross-sectional
dependence, the procedures for estimating the cointegrating relationships used here are those pro-
posed in BAI et al. (2009) and KAPETANIOS et al. (2011). The approach of BAI et al. (2009)
estimates the cointegration vector using procedures that render consistent and e¢ cient estimates
of the parameters  continuous updated fully-modied (CUP-FM) and continuous updated bias
corrected (CUP-BC) estimators considering the presence of I(0) and/or I(1) common factors.10
The strategy in KAPETANIOS et al. (2011) is based on the CCE approach in PESARAN (2006).11
Table A.5 reports the results of the estimates for the two models and the three estimators.
Regarding the cointegrating relationship between the revenues and expenditures, it can be seen
that the parameter estimates are positive and statistically signicant. The coe¢ cient estimated
using the CCE estimation procedure is somewhat below 1 (0.873), whereas the estimates using the
10Given the e¢ ciency property of these estimators, a statistical inference on the estimated parameters can be
performed at the limit, the estimated parameters are distributed according to normal distribution.
11These authors show that in panel cointegration, the pooled CCE estimator is a consistent estimator of the
cointegration vector, which is asymptotically distributed as a normal distribution. There is an important feature that
distinguishes both proposals. Thus, whereas KAPETANIOS et al. (2011) assume that the stochastic regressors are
weakly exogenous, BAI et al. (2009) specify a more general framework in which the stochastic regressors might be
endogenous.
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optimal estimation procedure in BAI et al. (2009) are placed around 1. In this regard, the null
hypothesis that the parameter is equal to 1 is rejected at the 5% signicance level for all estimates,
although the interpretation is qualitatively di¤erent. Thus, whereas the CEE estimate is smaller
than 1 (weak sustainability), note that the estimate using the CUP-FM and CUP-BC estimators
is slightly larger than 1, which leads to scal surpluses the scal decit is sustainable in the strict
sense (strong sustainability).
The second part of Table A.5 collects the results of the estimation of BOHNs (1998) model.
The estimated parameters are greater than zero and statistically signicant, so that the su¢ cient
condition of sustainability advocated by BOHN (1998) is met. It is worth noticing that the CCE
estimate is quite large compared to the other ones, something that can be explained by the e¢ cient
estimation property of the estimates in BAI et al. (2009). The estimates indicate that for every 100
euros increasing the debt of the Spanish ACs, the primary surplus increases by 6.8 euros (CUP-FM)
and 5 euros (CUP-BC), which is consistent with a reaction that satises the intertemporal budget
constraint.
It is interesting to note that the average interest rate of the debt for the period analysed and for
all the Spanish ACs is r = 0:07, a value that is in accordance with the e¢ cient estimate of . There-
fore, the null hypothesis that  = r = 0:07 cannot be rejected when using the CUP-FM estimate;
in this case, the value of the test statistic is (0:068  0:07) =0:005 =  0:4 , a value that is smaller
than the critical value at the 5% level of signicance of a standard normal distribution, whereas it
is rejected using the CUP-BC estimate in this case, (0:05  0:07) =0:005 =  4. Following BOHN
(2007), these results indicate that the IBC is satised.
In summary, the di¤erent approaches that have been followed in this paper have led to the
conclusion that the scal policy of the Spanish ACs is sustainable in the sense that in the long
term the IBC is met and in addition, that the primary surplus reacts positively and signicantly
to changes in the level of debt of the ACs.
6.5 Estimation of the individual cointegrating relationships: Fiscal decit sus-
tainability analysis
To gain an insight into the heterogeneous degree of the scal sustainability across the Spanish
ACs, the analysis proceeds with the estimation of a single equation of the error correction model
(ECM) specication for each region. The estimation assumes that there is cointegration among
the variables involved in the two specications that have been investigated, accounting for the
common factors that have been estimated. The model specied for the revenues and expenditures
relationship is given by:
Ri;t =
kiX
j=0
i;jGi;t j+
kiX
j=0
F 0t ji;j+
kiX
j=1
i;jRi;t j+i

Ri;t 1   i   iGi;t 1   F 0t 1i

+"i;t;
(17)
where the number of lags (ki) is chosen using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), with a
maximum of three lags, i = 1; : : : ; 17; a similar equation is specied for the primary surplus and
debt relationship. The estimation of the common factors is based on the CUP-BC estimation
procedure, although the results are robust to the use of the CUP-FM estimates. Table A.6 reports
the ^i parameter for each AC, showing that these individual estimates are close to 1. This picture
is consistent with the CUP-BC panel estimate that has been obtained. The lower estimate for i
is for the Balearic Islands, which is closely followed by Castilla-La Mancha, although even in these
cases the estimate is larger than 0.9. Therefore, we can conclude that the degree of scal decit
sustainability across the Spanish ACs is quite homogeneous. Table A.6 also reports the DOLS
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e¢ cient estimate for i obtained from the estimation of:
Ri;t = i + iGi;t + F
0
ti +
kiX
j= ki
i;jGi;t j +
kiX
j= ki
F 0t ji;j + ui;t (18)
considering a maximum of two lags and leads (ki = 2) the number of lags and leads is selected
for each region using the BIC. Only in six out of seventeen cases the Balearic Islands, Castilla-La
Mancha, Castilla and León, Catalonia and La Rioja is the null hypothesis that i = 1 is rejected
against the alternative hypothesis that i < 1, i.e. ACs for which weak scal sustainability is
found; as above, even in these cases, the estimate is larger than 0.9. There is, however, some
regional heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment to long-run disequilibria as the estimates for the
i parameter in equation (17) range from -0.368 (Valencia) to -1.752 (Castilla and León) note
that all ^i show the expected negative sign and are statistically signicant.
As for the primary surplus and debt relationship, Table A.7 shows that the degree of hetero-
geneity in the estimation of  from the ECM specication is higher, nding six estimates with
a negative sign Castilla-La Mancha, the Balearic Islands, Castilla and León, La Rioja, Murcia
and Asturias. As before, Table A.7 shows that all i estimates have the expected negative sign
and are statistically signicant. The DOLS estimates of the long-run relationship reveal that in
eight out of seventeen cases, ^i is statistically signicant, being positive in six cases Andalusia,
Castilla and León, Catalonia, Galicia, Madrid and the Basc Country and negative in two cases
Valencia and Navarre.12 Thus, for nine out of seventeen ACs, ^i is not statistically signicant.
This picture di¤ers from that drawn using the pooled estimate of  and indicates that although the
scal decit is sustainable according to Bohns denition from an aggregated point of view, there
is heterogeneous behaviour across the Spanish ACs.
The analysis conducted in this section aims to giving a glimpse into the heterogeneous behaviour
of the Spanish ACs in terms of scal decit sustainability. The approximation which draws on the
revenues and expenditures relationship points to sustainability, something that is in accordance
with the evidence drawn from the pooled estimators. The evidence in favour of sustainability is
weaker if we focus on the primary surplus and debt relationship. Thus, and contrary to what has
been found using the panel estimation, for most ACs this relationship is not statistically signicant.
Although this might appear contradictory, it should be borne in mind that Bohns approach imposes
some parameter constraints that might not be met when focusing on the individual estimation of
the model.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyses the sustainability of the decit of the Spanish ACs in the period 19842012
using real revenues, expenditures and debt. The literature on the sustainability of public decit
is divided into two major approaches. First, there are those that are based on the cointegration
analysis of the scal variables. Second, there are those based on scal rules which relate the
primary surplus to the level of debt of the economies. Both approaches have been presented in this
paper, discussing the similarities and di¤erences that characterize them in order to draw a robust
conclusion on the question of the sustainability of scal policy.
A rst set of results clearly shows that the variables involved in both approaches share the
characteristics of being I(1) non-stationary variables and being a¤ected by the presence strong
cross-sectional dependence. The cross-sectional dependence has been captured through the use
12As mentioned above, i  0 indicates the prevalence of a scal dominance regime.
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of parsimonious common factor models, which are able to account for global stochastic trends.
This just makes it clear that the system of nancing of the ACs and the competences that they
have undertaken are driven by the same legal framework that gives rise to this strong (pervasive)
cross-sectional dependence.
A second important result has been to evidence how the decit of the Spanish ACs as a whole is
sustainable in the long-run, regardless of the analytical approach chosen. The paper has also shown
that the scal rule that relates the primary surplus and debt levels at the beginning of the period
has also proved to dene a cointegrating relationship, with a parameter of interest that is similar
to the average interest rate of the debt of the period analysed. This implies that both approaches
lead to the same conclusion, namely that the scal decit of the ACs in Spain is sustainable for
the period analysed.
Finally, the paper focuses on the individual estimation of the di¤erent model specications to
assess the degree of heterogeneity of the scal sustainability of the Spanish ACs. Whereas the
results obtained from the individual estimation of the revenue and expenditure relationship agree
with the panel data analysis, heterogeneous conclusions have been obtained when focusing on the
estimation of the primary surplus and debt relationship.
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published paper.
2
T
ab
le
A
.1
:
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
ti
on
al
de
p
en
de
nc
e
N
G
(2
00
6)
P
E
SA
R
A
N
(2
00
4,
20
13
)
B
A
IL
E
Y
et
al
.
(2
01
2)
W
ho
le
sa
m
pl
e
Sm
al
l
sa
m
pl
e
L
ar
ge
sa
m
pl
e
sv
r(
W
)
p-
va
lu
e
sv
r(
S
)
p-
va
lu
e
sv
r(
L
)
p-
va
lu
e

W
C
D
L
M
W
C
D
 
 
L
 
U
R
ev
en
ue
s
5.
38
0.
00
1.
01
0.
16
3.
50
0.
00
0.
24
63
.8
7
30
.3
2
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
4.
36
0.
00
-1
.6
6
0.
95
5.
56
0.
00
0.
10
39
.9
7
24
.4
4
D
eb
t
3.
50
0.
00
0.
24
0.
41
3.
31
0.
00
0.
10
35
.7
6
23
.6
6
D
e
ci
t
6.
82
0.
00
0.
15
0.
44
6.
23
0.
00
0.
10
27
.0
5
20
.6
5
0.
94
-2
32
34
.3
1
23
23
6.
19
P
ri
m
ar
y
su
rp
lu
s
7.
07
0.
00
0.
21
0.
42
6.
16
0.
00
0.
10
26
.9
2
20
.7
0
0.
96
-2
21
23
.8
4
22
12
5.
75
3
T
ab
le
A
.2
:
P
an
el
da
ta
un
it
ro
ot
te
st
s
P
E
S
A
R
A
N
(2
00
7)
R
ev
en
ue
s
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
D
eb
t
D
e
ci
t
P
ri
m
ar
y
su
rp
lu
s
p
C
IP
S
C
IP
S*
C
IP
S
C
IP
S*
C
IP
S
C
IP
S*
C
IP
S
C
IP
S*
C
IP
S
C
IP
S*
0
-2
.4
3
-2
.4
3
-1
.9
1
-1
.9
1
-1
.3
1
-1
.3
1
-1
.0
9
-1
.0
9
-3
.6
7*
*
-3
.6
7*
*
1
-2
.4
6
-2
.4
6
-1
.6
7
-1
.6
7
-1
.0
3
-1
.0
3
-1
.3
3
-1
.3
3
-2
.1
1
-2
.1
1
2
-2
.3
3
-2
.3
3
-1
.6
1
-1
.6
3
-0
.9
6
-0
.9
6
-1
.1
5
-1
.1
5
-1
.9
0
-1
.9
0
3
-2
.0
9
-2
.0
9
-1
.5
6
-1
.6
2
-1
.1
5
-1
.1
1
-1
.4
2
-1
.4
2
-1
.9
3
-1
.9
3
4
-1
.5
2
-1
.5
2
-1
.0
8
-1
.1
0
-0
.7
9
-0
.8
2
-1
.2
2
-1
.2
2
-1
.8
4
-1
.8
4
5
-1
.1
8
-1
.1
8
-0
.9
2
-0
.9
2
-0
.8
9
-0
.9
5
-1
.3
4
-1
.3
4
-1
.5
6
-1
.5
6
M
O
O
N
an
d
P
E
R
R
O
N
(2
00
4)
R
ev
en
ue
s
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
D
eb
t
D
e
ci
t
P
ri
m
ar
y
su
rp
lu
s
r
t a
t b
t a
t b
t a
t b
t a
t b
t a
t b
1
-1
.6
1
-2
.0
3
-1
.3
0
-1
.4
4
0.
75
0.
75
2.
20
1.
58
-7
.4
5
-2
.8
1
2
-0
.5
4
-0
.5
5
-1
.4
0
-1
.5
7
0.
44
0.
51
5.
25
5.
05
-1
5.
16
-5
.3
2
3
-0
.5
8
-0
.5
9
0.
94
0.
91
0.
43
0.
51
7.
35
8.
84
-1
7.
38
-6
.9
0
4
-0
.2
5
-0
.2
5
1.
52
1.
39
2.
21
1.
75
6.
34
9.
39
-1
5.
55
-6
.2
7
5
-1
.4
1
-1
.2
9
-3
.7
7
-3
.7
2
2.
01
1.
74
4.
85
5.
43
-1
6.
96
-6
.5
5
6
-1
.7
0
-1
.5
2
-3
.9
7
-4
.0
5
1.
88
1.
58
6.
05
6.
54
-1
6.
23
-6
.4
3
B
A
I
an
d
N
G
(2
00
4)
R
ev
en
ue
s
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
D
eb
t
D
e
ci
t
P
ri
m
ar
y
su
rp
lu
s
T
es
t
p-
va
lu
e
T
es
t
p-
va
lu
e
T
es
t
p-
va
lu
e
T
es
t
p-
va
lu
e
T
es
t
p-
va
lu
e
A
D
F
id
io
sy
nc
ra
ti
c
-3
.5
4
0.
00
-1
.7
7
0.
04
-1
.1
6
0.
12
-7
.2
6
0.
00
-8
.0
2
0.
00
R
ev
en
ue
s
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
D
eb
t
D
e
ci
t
P
ri
m
ar
y
su
rp
lu
s
T
es
t
(r^
;r^
1
)
T
es
t
(r^
;r^
1
)
T
es
t
(r^
;r^
1
)
T
es
t
(r^
;r^
1
)
T
es
t
(r^
;r^
1
)
M
Q
(n
o
pa
r.
)
-2
6.
10
(6
,6
)
-1
6.
69
(6
,6
)
-2
3.
30
(6
,6
)
-2
3.
05
(6
,6
)
-2
2.
76
(6
,6
)
M
Q
(p
ar
.)
-2
1.
39
(6
,6
)
-2
1.
42
(6
,6
)
-2
5.
40
(6
,6
)
-2
6.
96
(6
,6
)
-2
7.
06
(6
,6
)
**
de
no
te
s
re
je
ct
io
n
of
th
e
nu
ll
hy
p
ot
he
si
s
of
un
it
ro
ot
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l
of
si
gn
i
ca
nc
e.
T
he
M
oo
n-
P
er
ro
n
te
st
st
at
is
ti
cs
di
st
ri
bu
te
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
a
st
an
da
rd
no
m
al
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
in
th
e
lim
it
.
4
Table A.3: BANERJEE AND CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2011, 2014) and WESTERLUND(2008)
panel cointegration test statistics
BANERJEE and CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2015)
Revenues and expenditures Primary decit and debt
Test p-value Test p-value
ADF-idio -2.47 0.007 -2.67 0.004
Test r^1 r^ r^1 r^
MQ (no par.) -4.58 1 1 -4.13 1 2
MQ (par.) -2.33 1 1 -20.85 2 2
BANERJEE and CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2011)
Revenues and expenditures Primary decit and debt
Test ^ Test ^
CADFp -4.00** 0.8727 -3.97** 0.1742
WESTERLUND (2008)
Revenues and expenditures Primary decit and debt
r DHg p-value DHp p-value DHg p-value DHp p-value
1 82.04 0.00 4.87 0.00 9.73 0.00 13.87 0.00
2 7.63 0.00 1.99 0.02 9.76 0.00 3.33 0.00
3 6.23 0.00 0.23 0.41 16.14 0.00 3.43 0.00
4 11.45 0.00 0.56 0.29 14.09 0.00 2.98 0.00
5 16.29 0.00 -0.09 0.54 9.49 0.00 5.14 0.00
6 7.06 0.00 4.72 0.00 16.13 0.00 6.53 0.00
Table A.4: BAI and CARRION-I-SILVESTRE (2013) panel cointegration test statistics
Revenues and expenditures
r MSB p-value Pm p-value P p-value ^
1 -2.678 0.004 7.781 0.000 98.163 0.000 1.005
2 -2.755 0.003 7.293 0.000 94.143 0.000 0.979
3 -2.815 0.002 6.033 0.000 83.753 0.000 0.955
4 -2.762 0.003 5.698 0.000 80.990 0.000 0.943
5 -2.626 0.004 5.642 0.000 80.521 0.000 0.970
6 -2.453 0.007 4.263 0.000 69.150 0.000 0.947
Primary surplus and debt
r MSB p-value Pm p-value P p-value ^
1 -1.507 0.066 3.322 0.000 61.396 0.003 -0.073
2 -0.989 0.161 3.204 0.001 60.423 0.003 0.142
3 -0.192 0.424 1.266 0.103 44.438 0.108 0.112
4 -0.791 0.214 -0.208 0.582 32.288 0.552 0.143
5 -1.726 0.042 1.962 0.025 50.175 0.036 0.111
6 -2.046 0.020 2.518 0.006 54.761 0.013 0.117
5
Table A.5: Panel data cointegrating vector estimates
Revenues and expenditures
CCE CUP-FM CUP-BC r^
 0.873 1.012 1.011 1
s.e. 0.051 0.005 0.005
t-ratio ( = 0) 17.118 210.005 210.209
t-ratio ( = 1) -2.490 2.549 2.241
Primary surplus and debt
CCE CUP-FM CUP-BC r^
 0.174 0.068 0.050 2
s.e. 0.056 0.005 0.005
t-ratio ( = 0) 3.135 12.793 9.596
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Table A.6: Estimation of a single equation Error Correction Model for the revenues and expendi-
tures relationship. CUP-BC estimation based results
ECM estimation DOLS estimation of i
^i;0 ^i;0 ^i;1 ^i;1 ^i;1 ^i ^i ^i ^i ti=0 ti=1
AND 0.91 -1.79 -1.17 1.05 -2.13 1.05 97.29 4.99
(15.12) (-5.99) (-5.56)
ARA 0.92 -0.28 -0.73 0.98 -0.33 0.98 106.33 -1.81
(21.05) (-5.14) (-3.69)
AST 0.95 -0.13 -0.66 1.01 -0.22 1.01 100.76 0.70
(25.51) (-3.19) (-4.31)
BAL 0.81 -0.41 -1.10 0.92 -0.34 0.80 38.25 -9.68
(6.60) (-3.77) (-4.97)
CAN 1.01 -0.40 -1.26 1.00 -0.34 1.00 95.87 0.13
(17.66) (-4.94) (-6.28)
CANT 0.81 -0.10 -0.61 0.97 -0.15 0.98 29.01 -0.60
(8.45) (-1.56) (-3.17)
CYL 0.99 -0.19 -1.75 0.99 -0.57 0.98 187.84 -3.86
(26.80) (-2.12) (-9.62)
CLM 0.72 -0.51 0.34 -0.03 0.12 -1.28 0.93 -0.82 0.94 80.06 -5.53
(10.19) (-2.83) (1.18) (-0.13) (0.35) (-3.88)
CAT 0.87 -2.75 -0.93 0.97 -2.37 0.97 107.99 -2.96
(12.22) (-7.15) (-3.82)
VAL 0.92 -1.01 -0.37 1.00 -1.47 0.96 30.17 -1.23
(9.05) (-3.44) (-1.92)
EXT 0.89 -0.20 -0.92 1.00 -0.29 1.01 104.33 0.96
(16.57) (-3.14) (-5.02)
GAL 0.92 -0.31 -0.46 1.02 -0.42 0.99 127.93 -0.92
(17.94) (-2.75) (-3.03)
MAD 0.87 -0.79 -1.50 1.04 -0.99 1.06 127.86 7.08
(13.06) (-2.90) (-6.86)
MUR 0.82 -0.45 -1.28 0.99 -0.47 1.04 78.65 2.72
(7.92) (-4.11) (-5.77)
NAV 1.51 -0.37 0.07 -0.64 0.24 -0.69 1.01 -0.25 1.00 28.99 0.09
(11.34) (-3.59) (0.44) (-3.61) (2.09) (-3.25)
BASC 0.83 -1.30 -0.73 1.05 -1.04 1.04 26.40 1.05
(4.78) (-4.64) (-3.55)
RIO 0.94 -0.06 -1.15 0.95 -0.04 0.95 57.61 -2.89
(10.22) (-2.40) (-5.43)
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Table A.7: Estimation of a single equation Error Correction Model for the primary surplus and
debt relationship. CUP-BC estimation based results
ECM estimation DOLS estimation of ^i
^i;0 ^i;1;0 ^i;2;0 ^i ^i ^i;1 ^i;2 ^i ti=0
AND 0.10 -1.98 2.23 -1.48 0.10 -1.98 2.20 0.11 24.07
(3.12) (-19.74) (21.18) (-7.91)
ARA -0.03 -0.29 -0.13 -0.83 0.01 -0.32 -0.07 -0.01 -0.20
(-0.40) (-4.98) (-2.25) (-3.78)
AST -0.12 -0.13 0.00 -0.70 -0.01 -0.19 0.10 0.03 0.61
(-1.73) (-3.10) (0.03) (-3.55)
BAL 0.06 -0.51 0.06 -1.13 -0.05 -0.29 -0.03 -0.04 -0.72
(0.50) (-4.11) (0.51) (-4.81)
CAN 0.13 -0.45 0.13 -1.12 0.06 -0.34 0.16 0.00 0.10
(1.54) (-5.54) (1.54) (-5.19)
CANT -0.01 -0.14 0.14 -0.60 0.08 -0.19 0.09 0.18 1.80
(-0.04) (-2.13) (2.04) (-2.83)
CYL -0.03 -0.38 0.48 -1.05 -0.04 -0.47 0.39 0.34 12.67
(-0.37) (-3.29) (3.57) (-4.46)
CLM -0.19 -0.63 -1.62 -0.57 -0.06 -0.76 -1.20 -0.11 -1.75
(-2.72) (-4.02) (-11.59) (-2.33)
CAT 0.06 -2.77 -2.14 -0.51 0.05 -2.72 -2.36 0.06 17.37
(9.73) (-36.11) (-30.88) (-2.63)
VAL -0.08 -1.01 0.89 -0.53 0.00 -1.25 1.35 -0.06 -3.26
(-1.42) (-4.23) (4.21) (-2.68)
EXT -0.16 -0.19 -0.14 -0.84 0.03 -0.28 -0.02 0.02 0.46
(-1.46) (-2.83) (-2.07) (-4.20)
GAL -0.02 -0.36 0.24 -0.70 0.09 -0.46 0.33 0.11 13.18
(-0.31) (-4.05) (2.54) (-3.84)
MAD 0.09 -1.05 1.93 -1.10 0.04 -0.81 1.81 0.08 7.93
(1.99) (-6.49) (12.10) (-5.06)
MUR 0.07 -0.63 0.46 -1.36 -0.02 -0.44 0.34 -0.04 -1.02
(0.57) (-6.08) (4.72) (-6.17)
NAV 0.08 -0.30 -0.08 -0.70 0.14 -0.29 -0.02 -0.22 -32.72
(0.47) (-2.39) (-0.57) (-3.17)
BASC 0.25 -1.27 -0.34 -0.70 0.21 -1.10 -0.13 0.08 2.64
(2.24) (-5.37) (-1.50) (-3.08)
RIO 0.24 -0.09 0.07 -0.65 -0.03 -0.04 -0.00 -0.05 -0.83
(1.61) (-2.80) (1.88) (-2.35)
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Figure A.1. Revenues and expenditures of the Spanish ACs
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Figure A.1 (Cont). Revenues and expenditures of the Spanish ACs
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Figure A.1 (Cont). Revenues and expenditures of the Spanish ACs
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Figure A.2. Decit (left) and debt (right) over GDP ratios of the Spanish ACs
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Figure A.2 (Cont). Decit (left) and debt (right) over GDP ratios of the Spanish ACs
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Figure A.2 (Cont). Decit (left) and debt (right) over GDP ratios of the Spanish ACs
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Figure A.3. Debt in nominal and real terms
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Figure A.3 (Cont). Debt in nominal and real terms
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Figure A.3 (Cont). Debt in nominal and real terms
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